Synopsis
Subcommands
cowboy bridge fraud-proof submit
Submit a fraud-proof (or verifier-maintenance) bundle for a published chain-root commitment and wait for committed execution. The door is permissionless: any sender may submit and pays ordinary fees.
Behavior:
- Parse
--registryas a 20-byte address and read--bundleas raw bytes. - Validate the bundle the way the wire codec will: it must be a JSON object, and it must fit the consensus bundle bound less 8 KiB of transaction framing (header, chain id, nonce, limits, fees, signature). The contents are otherwise opaque; only the node’s verifier adapter interprets them.
- Print
Submitting fraud proof for src_chain_id=<n> height=<n> (<bytes> bytes). - Load the private key via auto-discovery, fetch the nonce, basefee, and chain id, sign a
SubmitFraudProofsystem instruction with the given cycle and cell limits and the ordinary system-transaction access limit, print the transaction hash, andPOSTit to<rpc-url>/submit. - Wait up to 90 seconds for a committed receipt (following the node’s finalized-receipt stream); a receipt that reports a failed execution is returned as a
transaction_failederror. - Print
SubmitFraudProof submitted: <response>.
Example:
Edge Cases
- A bundle that is not valid JSON, is a JSON array or scalar rather than an object, or exceeds the submittable size is refused before anything is signed, with the byte limits stated in the error.
- If the transaction does not commit within the wait window, the command fails with
receipt_pendingandSubmitFraudProof transaction 0x... did not commit within 90s; check it with cowboy transaction status --hash ... before sending anything again. - Unlike
cowboy timerandcowboy deploy-code, which take their limits from the node’s estimate and return on acceptance, this command waits for commitment and signs with explicit limits (10,000,000 cycles and cells by default).